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Stating its grounds with candor, the court clearly indicated that the decision
was intended as a penalization of Campbell for turning its standardized con-
tract into a device for exploiting the farmer.
RIGHTS TO LOCAL UNION PROPERTY AFTER SECESSION::
WHEN a majority or the entire membership of a local union breaks away
from the parent organization, the seceding group usually tries to take collec-
tive bargaining rights and local union property along with it. Conflicting
claims by the parent or "loyal" minority are practically inevitable. While the
national or state labor relations board handles the more important problem of
determining the rightful collective bargaining representative,' conflicting claims
to local property are carried to the courts.
In resolving these property interests courts look to the two-fold contract
relationship which binds the parent and local as well as the local and its indi-
vidual members. This contract, embraced in the charters and constitutions of
the parent and local unions, impresses monies collected by the local with a
trust for the benefit of all members, and is impliedly accepted by workers on
joining the union. 2 In addition to this contract, courts in determining entitle-
ment to local property consider several other factors: the type of funds in-
volved, the derivation of the local's charter, the relative organization dates of
the parent and local, and the extent of the secession movement involved. "
In Harker v. McKissock,' a recent New Jersey case, the court looked to the
organization dates of the Industrial Union of Mlarine and Shipbuilding Work-
ers of America and its Local No. 1 to determine whether the local's seceding
majority or remaining minority was entitled to the local's funds. Local No. 1
had been created in 1933 as an independent voluntary association of shipyard
workers, and through its efforts the national had been formed the following
year. Subsequently, however, the parent violated its own constitution by
admitting to the national organization locals not composed of shipbuilding
workers.5 Thereafter it acted contrary to the alleged interests of the local by
premium, but died before his application was approved by the home office. Pointing to
another clause in the policy which made such approval an express condition precedent,
the insurer had denied liability.)
* Harker v. McKissock, 62 A2d 405 (NJ.Ch. 1948).
1. Comment, 51 YALE L. J. 465, 466-72 (1942) ; Note, 48 YALE L. J. 1053 (1939);
Comment, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 516 (1940) ; Annotation, 131 A.L.R. 902 (1940).
2. See, e.g, Grand Lodge of Int. Ass'n of Machinists v. Reba, 97 Conn. 235, 233, 116
Atl. 235, 236 (1922) ; Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Williams, 211 Ky. 633, 644, 277
S.W. 500, 502-3 (1925) ; O'Neill v. Delany, 158 N.Y.Supp. 665, 666-7 (Sup. Ct. 1909);
Note, 22 NoTs DA-xra LAW%,. 99 (1946).
3. For a discussion of the weight Which courts sometimes give to some of these factors
in cases involving benevolent non-profit associations and labor unions, see Note, 47 YALE
L.J. 483 (1938).
4. 62 A.2d 405 (NJ. Ch. 1948).
S. The constitution of the national provided that it opposed craft unionism and ;as in
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opposing Congressional legislation beneficial to the shipbuilding industry.,
At a local meeting called to protest these actions, an overwhelming majority
of members present voted to secede from the national.7 In the resulting suit
by the loyal minority against the seceding majority,8 title to the local's funds
were held to rest in the seceding group.
Following an apparently formalistic approach to the problem, the court de-
cided that since the local had been created before the national, it was an "in-
dependent" body which could disaffiliate on the vote of a majority of its mem-
bers.9 Having once existed without the national, the local retained the ca-
pacity to reestablish a separate existence at any time. Regardless of whether
it represented the objectives for which the affiliation had originally been
formed, a majority on secession could retain the local funds as representative
of the "original" local.10 On the other hand, had the local been created by the
national, and thus been "dependent," the loyal minority in the Harker case
would have been awarded the funds.'1
While New Jersey decisions have repeatedly differentiated between prop-
erty rights of "independent" and "dependent" locals, 12 other courts have not
given weight to this distinction.' 8 In respect to incorporated locals, the pre-
favor of "one industry, one union," and that its jurisdiction should extend to "all workers
employed in shipbuilding, ship repairing, marine maintenance industry and industries pro-
ducing marine equipment and allied enterprises." The dissentient members of the local con-
tended that these provisions were violated by admission to national membership of organiza-
tions of turnkeys in federal penitentiaries, attendants at mental hospitals and other non-
shipyard workers. Id. at 407.
6. The national opposed legislation then pending in Congress to increase government
subsidies for shipbuilding. Ibid.
7. Of a total membership of about 3,200 members over 700 attended the meeting. On
the secession vote all voted in favor of disaffiliation except 25 %vho did not vote and 8 who
voted in the negative. Subsequently 90.04% of the total membership gave written approval
of the action taken at the meeting. Id. at 407, 415.
8. The national organization did not become a party to this litigation.
9. The court reasoned that a local which had existed prior to the creation of the par-
ent became merely a constituent unit of a voluntary confederation when it joined the parent.
62 A.2d 405, 413 (N.J. Ch. 1948).
10. Though there was no express provision in the constitution of the national relative
to "withdrawal," the constitution did contain a provision that all local by-laws must be ap-
proved by the national before becoming effective. Article III, Sec. 3 of the Constitution of
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America. The court discounted
this provision, however, declaring that it was not intended to cover a by-law passed by the
local to sever relations with its parent. 62 A.2d 405, 415 (N.J. Ch. 1948).
11. The court said that a group withdrawing from a "dependent" organization must be
supported by a unanimous vote of the membership in order to constitute itself the "original"
local entitled to the funds. Id. at 410.
12. E.g., International Union v. Becherer, 142 N.J.Eq. 561, 61 A.2d 16 (Ch. 1948);
State Council v. Enterprise Council, 75 N.J.Eq. 245, 72 At. 19 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909);
State Council v. National Council, 71 N.J.Eq, 433, 64 Atl. 561 (Ch. 1906), afj'd, 67 Atl. 432
(1907).
13. Brown v. Hook, 79 Cal.App.2d 781, 180 P.2d 982 (1st Dist. 1947) ; Alexion v. Hol-
lingsworth, 289 N.Y. 91, 43 N.E2d 825 (1942), reversing 28 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct. 1941),
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vailing view has been that the local may secede without forfeiting its property
to the parent irrespective of the relative organization dates of the national
and local or of any provisions in the parent's constitution.1 Underlying
these decisions is the theory that even after the affiliation the foundation of
the local organization continues to be the charter granted by the state, since the
local cannot surrender to another body those basic powers derived from the
state charter.
When dealing with unincorporated labor organizations, which comprise the
major number of union locals today,'5 courts distinguish between "special"
funds, collected under local direction for purely local purposes, and "general"
funds, collected under direction of the parent to meet its assessments or to
make payments to the various funds which it administers.10  Monies raised
for purely local purposes, such as local expense funds or local funeral funds,
are not impressed by the two-fold contract with a trust for purposes approved
by the parent.17 Accordingly the parent cannot deprive a seceding majority
and 263 App. Div. 710, 31 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st Dep't 1941) (which had granted funds to the
seceding majority folloving the "independent-dependent" dichotomy).
14. 1oyer v. Butte Miners' Union, 232 Fed. 788 (D.Mont.1916) ; Goodman v. Jedidjah
Lodge No. 7, 67 11d. 117, 9 Atl. 13 (1887) (withdrawal permitted despite protest of lo3 l
minority); State Council v. National Council, 71 N.J.Eq. 433, 64 Ad. 561 (Ch. 1905), aff'd,
67 Atl. 432 (N.J.Ch. 1907). The rule holds true also where the local is e,%pelled by the
national. State ex rel. Graham v. Miller, 66 Iowa 26, 23 N.W. 241 (1M5) ; Wells v. Moni-
han, 129 N.Y. 161, 29 N.E. 232 (1S91).
15. Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the Proposed
Federal Labor Relations Act of 1947, SE-.. REP. No. 105, q0th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947).
16. The uses to which general funds may be put by the local are often spelled out in
the constitution or rules of the parent organizations. For e.,ample: "The General Funds or
property of a Local Union shall be used only for such purposes as are specified in the Con-
stitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood and as may be required to transact and prop-
erly conduct its business, viz.: Payment of salaries and donations to sick members; purchas-
ing stationery, books, cards, printing, payment of rent, or any legally authorized bill against
the Local Union. But under no circumstances shall any of the General Funds be used for
loans or donations to members, Contingent Funds or for political or religious purposes.
Violation of this section subjects the offending Local Union to the penalty of suspension."
Section 58 of the Rules and Regulations of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America as quoted in Local No. 2508, L. & S.W. v. Cairns, 197 Wash. 476, 479-80,
85 P2d 1109, 1111 (1938).
For an excellent discussion of the differences in treatment accorded properties raised
by locals under direction of the parent and those raised on its own initiative, see dissenting
opinion of Justice Beals in Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. International W.WW. of A, 197
Wash. 491, 500-15, 85 P.2d 1099, 1103-9 (1933).
17. E.g., O'Neill v. Delany, 158 N.Y.Supp. 665 (Sup.Ct 1969) ; Shipwrights', Joiners'
& Calkers' Ass'n Local No. 2 v. Mitchell, 60 Wash. 529, 111 Pac. 730 (1910) ; cf. Detroit
Savings Bank v. Haines, 128 Mich. 38, 87 N.W. 66 (1901) (benevolent association) ; Note,
47 Y.u. L.J. 483, 484-5 (1938).
If the local dissolves, special local funds will not revert to the parent but will be dis-
tributed among the local members. State Council Junior Order United Mechanics of Penn-
sylvania v. Emery, 219 Pa. 461, 63 AfU. 1023 (1908). The result vwill be the same where the
charter of the local is revoked by the parent. Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126, 269 Pac.
455 (1st Dist. 1928).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of any special funds even where provisions in its constitution require for-
feiture of local property in the event of withdrawal or dissolution."8 But
the local charter does bind local members to employ the funds only for those
purposes agreed upon at the time of their collection, which may prevent a
withdrawing group from conveying the special local funds to a rival unionY1
Rights to general property, as distinguished from special property, are de-
termined primarily through an examination of "withdrawal" and "dissolution"
provisions in the parent's constitution. Following the rules laid down by
courts in dealing with benevolent associations, it would appear that if the con-
stitution contains no "withdrawal" or "dissolution" provisions, secession can-
not be effected by less than a unanimous vote of the local members. 20 Even
if the property is vested by the constitution in the local, a withdrawing ma-
jority cannot force a loyal minority to resort to desertion of the parent in
order to preserve its property rights. The trust of local funds created by
the t:wo-fold contract is for the benefit of all members of the local as long as
they remain members of the local.21
18. Donovan v. Danielson, 271 Mass. 267, 171 N.E. 823 (1930) (benevolent associa-
tion) ; cf. Wicks v. Monihan, 130 N.Y. 232, 29 N.E. 139 (1891) ; State Council Junior Or-
der of Mechanics of Pennsylvania v. Emery, 219 Pa. 461, 68 Atl. 1023 (1903) (constitution
provided for forfeiture upon "dissolution or expulsion" and expulsion took place). This
generally includes monies out of which are paid assessments levied by the parent since
they are not affected with a trust in the parent's favor beyond the amount of the assessment,
e.g., Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Sometimes courts overlook
this distinction, however, and impress the entire fund with the trust for the benefit of the
parent, e.g., Lumber and Sawmill Workers v. International W.W. of A., 197 Wash. 491, 85
P.2d 1099 (1938) ; Local No. 2508 L. & S. W. v. Cairns, 197 Wash. 476, 85 P.2d 1109 (1938).
Though these payments constitute a direct financial interest of the parent in the continued
affiliation of the local, this interest is insufficient under the two-fold contract to entitle the
parent to claim the entire funds after local members have complied with the constitutional re-
quirements for withdrawal. National Council of American Mechanics v. State Council, 64
N.J.Eq. 470, 53 Atl. 1082 (Ch. 1903).
19. E.g., Liggett v. Koivunen, 34 N.W.2d 345 (Minn. 1948) ; see Suffridge v. O'Grady,
84 N.Y.S.2d 211, 217 (Sup.Ct. 1948) (a local acquiring funds for a specific purpose could
not divert them from that purpose even by unanimous consent).
20. Henry v. Cox, 25 Ohio App. 487, 159 N.E. 101 (1927) (benevolent association),
As to property rights in the event of secession in benevolent associations generally, see Note
47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 927 (1914) ; WRiuGHTINGToN, UNINconsoRATF ASSOCIATIONS AND But-
NESS TRUSTS § 60 (2d ed. 1923).
21. See, Scott v. Donahue, 93 Cal.App. 126, 132, 269 Pac. 455, 458 (1928) ; accord,
Steinmiller v. McKeon, 21 N.Y.S.2d 621, 623 (Sup.Ct. 1940), af'd nere., 261 App, Div.
899, 26 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd ment. 288 N.Y. 508, 41 N.E.2d 925 (1942) ;
Plywood and Veneer Workers v. Taylor, 197 Wash. 515, 518-9, 85 P.2d. 1116, 1117 (1938).
This follows logically from the theory of benevolent associations that the property of
the local belongs to all of the members and that its permissible uses are determined by the
two-fold contract. Interest in the property is abandoned by those members who withdraw
even though they are a majority of the membership. Unanimous withdrawal from the parent
amounts to a dissolution of the local, entitling its constituent members to the property
though they do not distribute it among themselves. See Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d
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Where the constitution makes no mention of "withdravwal" but instead pro-
vides for dissolution in the event local membership falls below a designated
number, the seceding majority is entitled to the funds if the specified minimum
does not remain loy-al. But should the constitution also provide for "for-
feiture" to the parent in the event of "dissolution," the parent can claim the
property when the local membership falls below the necessary size.P Yet if
the constitutional minimum of the local refuses to secede, neither the parent
nor the seceding majority can lay claim to the local's funds under a "dissolu-
tion" provision, for the loyal minority is entitled to the property by virtue of
the trust among local members imposed by the two-fold contract.24
In addition to a "dissolution-forfeiture" provision, the constitutions of
211 (Sup.Ct. 1948) (theory explained in respect to special property) ; and see generally,
,VRIGHTm-GTO, U.TImNcORPoaAkTED ASSOCUATIONS AND Busnmss TnysTs § 60, pp. 351-3
(2d ed. 1923).
22. State v. Postal, 215 Minn. 427, 10 N.W.2d 375 (1943). The burden of showing that
the necessary minimum no longer remains is on the seceding body. See Rosenthal v. Rein-
feld, 48 Mlisc. 652, 96 N.Y.Supp. 199 (Sup.Ct. 1905).
It is generally recognized that a benevolent association may be dissolved in the man-
ner provided in its constitution; and in the absence of any provision on the subject, it
cannot be voluntarily dissolved except by unanimous vote of its members. See Koerner
Lodge No. 6, K. of P. v. Grand Lodge K. of P., 146 Ind. 639, 652-3, 45 N.E. 1103, 1103
(1897). In the absence of charter provision, where the court finds that there has been a
"dissolution," the property will be distributed per capita among the members. See Low
v. Harris, 90 F.2d 783, 784 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Local No. 2503 L. & S. AV. v. Cairns, 197
Wash. 476, 487, 85 P.2d 1109, 1114 (1933). Where there is a provision in the constitu-
tion designating the minimum number with which the local can function, a dissolution
cannot be declared unless withdrawals have left less than this number, McFadden v.
Murphy, 149 'Mass. 341, 21 N.E. 868 (1899) (benevolent association). See Eanzler v.
L. C. & S. T. Workers Local, 20 Wash.2d 718, 724-5, 149 P2d 276, 279 (1944).
Where a local is expelled by the parent, it is held that the parent cannot claim the
local funds by virtue of a "dissolution" provision. Grand Lodge of Int. Ass'n of Machin-
ists v. Reba, 97 Conn. 235, 116 Atl. 235 (1922).
23. Subsidiary High Court of Foresters v. Pestarino, 41 Cal.App. 712, 183 Pac. 297
(1919). Cf. Brown v. Hook, 79 Cal.App2d 781, 180 P2d 982 (1947), where more than the
charter minimum remained loyal but the loyal group failed to protest the secession and did
not join the suit of the parent to recover the funds. The court gave the funds to the parent
as having a better right to them by virtue of the "dissolution-forfeiture" provision than
did the seceders. Cf. Die Gross-Loge Des Ordens der Hermanns-Soeline v. Wolfer, 42
Colo. 393, 94 Pac. 329 (1908) (benevolent association) ; see Koerner Lodge No. 6, K. of
P. v. Grand Lodge K. of P., 146 Ind. 639, 45 N.E. 1103 (1S97).
If the constitution provides for forfeitures in case of "expulsion," the parent still can-
not claim the funds unless it has justifiable cause for the expulsion. See Brotherhood of
Railway Trainmen v. Villiams, 211 Ky. 638, 646-7, 277 S.W. 500, 504 (1925).
24. Low v. Harris, 90 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1937); State v. Postal, 215 Minn. 427, 10
N.V2d 373 (1943) ; Hogan v. Williams, 160 Ore. 520, 86 P.2d 456 (1939). Where there
is no charter minimum, nothing less than unanimous secession will entitle the seccling
group to the local funds under a "dissolution" provision. See Grand Court of Washing-
ton F. 0. A. v. Hodel, 74 Wash. 314, 317-., 133 Pac. 438, 439-40 (1913) (benevolent as-
sociation).
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many parent organizations contain express limitations on a local's right to
"withdraw." 23  The usual proviso is that an attempted separation is ineffec-
tual so long as a stated number of local members is willing to continue the
organization. The minimum number is typically very small ;20 and they need
not protest the withdrawal motion or even attend the meeting when the seces-
sion vote is taken provided they assert their loyalty and lay claim to the local
charter within a reasonable time after the decision to withdraw.21 Courts
recognize them as the "original" local, and uphold their claim to local property
against the withdrawing members. 28 Should the number remaining loyal be
less than the charter minimum, the local's property will vest in the parent
under the "dissolution-forfeiture" provision.Y
Where the constitution contains a "withdrawal" but not a "dissolution-
forfeiture" provision, the loyal group is entitled to the funds so long as the
necessary minimum remains in the local. 30 Where the number falls below
25. The typical provision of union constitutions is to the effect that the property of
the local must be forfeited to the parent in case of "dissolution, suspension, or secession"
of the local. Note, 47 YALE L.J. 483, 484 (1938). For cases involving this type of provi-
sion, see Steinmiller v. McKeon, 21 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup.Ct. 1940), aff'd viem., 261 App.
Div. 899,26 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd inem., 288 N.Y. 508,41 N.E.2d 925 (1942);
Harris ex rel. Carpenters' Union No. 2573 v. Backman, 160 Ore. 520, 86 P.2d 456 (1939);
Local No. 2618, Plywood and Veneer Workers v. Taylor, 197 Wash. 515, 85 P.2d 1116
(1938) ; cf. Quinn v. Marvin, 168 Ore. 52, 120 P2d 227 (1941) (where the majority in an
A.F. of L. local accepted C.I.O. memberships in violation of a charter provision against dual
unionism, the minority, which was greater than the minimum set in the withdrawal pro-
vision, was held entitled to declare itself to be the true union entitled to local funds).
26. E.g., Rosenthal v. Reinfeld, 48 Misc. 652, 96 N.Y.Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1905)
(ten) ; State v. Postal, 215 Minn. 427, 10 N.W. 2d 373 (1943), and Brownfield v. Simon,
94 Misc. 720, 158 N.Y. Supp. 187 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (seven) ; Steinmiller v. McKeon, 21
N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd nem. 261 App.Div. 899, 26 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1st Dep't
1941), aff'd mere. 288 N.Y. 508, 41 N.E. 2d 925 (1942) (five).
27. Local No. 2618, Plywood and Veneer Workers v. Taylor, 197 Wash. 515, 85 P.2d
1116 (1938) ; Local No. 2508 L. & S. W. v. Cairns, 197 Wash. 476, 85 P.2d 1109 (1938) ;
cf. Low v. Harris, 90 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1937) ("dissolution-forfeiture" provision but no
withdrawal provision).
28. Steinmiller v. McKeon, 21 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup.Ct. 1940), aff'd ncult, 261 App.
Div. 899, 26 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd mem., 288 N.Y. 508, 41 N.E.2d 925
(1942) ; Alexion v. Hollingsworth, 289 N.Y. 91, 43 N.E.2d 825 (1942); Harris ex rel.
Carpenters' Union No. 2573 v. Backman, 160 Ore. 520, 86 P.2d 456 (1939).
29. See Ahlendorf v. Barkous, 20 Ind.App. 657, 664, 50 N.E. 887, 889 (1898).
30. Brownfield v. Simon, 94 Misc. 720, 158 N.Y.Supp. 187 (Sup.Ct. 1916); Local No.
2508 L. & S. W. v. Cairns, 197 Wash. 476, 85 P2d 1109 (1938); Lumber and Sawmill
Workers v. International W.W. of A., 197 Wash. 491, 85 P.2d 1099 (1938). Where the
constitution contains no specification as to the necessary minimum which must remain
loyal to prevent a withdrawal, it has been held that all must join the movement to entitle
the secedents to the property. Bridgeport Brass Workers Union, Local 320 v. Smith,
No. 75979, Super. Ct., Fairfield County, Conn., Sept. 20, 1948.
Where the parent organization itself changes affiliation, the funds are granted to the
faction of the local which adheres to it although a constitutional minimum expresses a
desire to continue under the former organization. Textile Workers Union of Anniston v.
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this minimum, a seceding majority would seem entitled to the funds since the
contract conditions of withdrawal have been complied with. Nevertheless,
courts have favored the parent.31 Maintaining that this minimum member-
ship clause was inserted only for the benefit of the parent, the courts have
said that a provision which prevents a local from withdraing so long as a
stated minimum objects is not equivalent to an affirmative provision permitting
withdrawal with the funds whenever less than the minimum protests.2 They
have even said that a parent has power to keep its local alive when no faith-
ful local members remain.m In that event those new members which the par-
ent might recruit to fill the vacant ranks of the local would be entitled to the
local property.?'
Courts have derived these rules from principles traditionally applied to
voluntary benevolent associations without considering the special problems
posed by their application to trade unions.35 They have accepted as precedent
a body of law which strongly favors the parent organization or the loyal local
minority regardless of the effect on important union functions such as those
performed in collective bargaining.
The National Labor Relations Act60 contemplates a situation in which
labor and management can bargain on relatively equal terms?7 The seces-
Local No. 21500, 240 Ala. 239, 198 So. 606 (1940) ; accord. Martin v. Smith, 225 fass.
227, 190 N.E. 113 (1934) (question was only as to which group was the "original" local,
no funds being involved).
31. Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S2d 211 (Sup.Ct. 1943) (on the grounds that the
insurance fund there involved was collected under the collective bargaining agreement
negotiated by the parent) ; accord, Centralia Labor Temple Ass'n v. O'Day, 139 Urash.
331, 246 Pac. 930 (1926) (vhere membership fell below. the charter minimum, the court
allowed the parent to take the funds from the remaining minority and give them to a
newly created local). See f & f Vood-Working Co. v. Plywood & V. Vorkers Local
Union, 23 F. Supp. 11, 18 (D. Ore. 1938), aff'd on other 9rounds, 101 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1939). But see Local No. 2508, L. & S. MV. v. Cairns. 197 Wash. 476, 433, 85 P2d 1169,
1114 (1938).
32. See Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d 211, 218-9 (Sup.Ct. 1943).
33. See, IN & Mf Wood-Working Co. v. Plywood & V. Workers Local Union, 23
F.Supp. 11, 18 (D. Ore. 1938), aff'd on other grounds, 101 F2d 93S (9th Cir. 1939).
34. Centralia Labor Temple Ass'n v. O'Day, 139 Wash. 331, 246 Pac. 930 (1926)
(benevolent association).
35. It has been frequently stated that the same legal concepts are applicable to labor
unions and voluntary non-profit associations generally. AVIaUo-nr:ro,;, U,.:rco.PO-TArUD
AssocrAnoNs A-NTD BusImEss TRusTs, § 54, p. 283 (2d ed. 1923) ; Ciafee, The Intcrnal
Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Hznv. L. Rnv. 993, 1001, 1016, 1021 (1930).
The courts in dealing with labor problems rely heavily on cases involving these associa-
tions. See, e.g., Liggett v. Koivunen, 34 N.AV. 2d 345 (Minn. 1948) ; Harris ex rel. Car-
penters' Union No. 2573 v. Bacmaan, 160 Ore. 520, 86 P.2d 456 (1939) ; Grand Lodge of
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Reba, 97 Conn. 235, 116 AUt. 235 (1922).
36. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et scq. (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1948).
37. The policy is stated in Section 1 of the Act: "The inequality of bargaining pav:er
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
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sion of local groups prevents a parent from presenting a unified front and
accordingly reduces its power to force concessions from management. 8 Yet
secession of a local group is not likely to be discouraged by threat of depriva-
tion of local funds. Nor has the National Labor Relations Board felt that
the best interests of collective bargaining are served if a discontented local
group is forced to remain an unreasonably long time under leadership which
it no longer supports. While, in the interest of stability, the Board some-
times withholds certification of a new majority union during the term of a
collective agreement, it tends to enforce the democratic rights of workers to be
represented at all times by a union of their own choosing.30
In disposing of local funds, the courts if possible should assist the Board
in its efforts to establish stable but democratic bargaining units. From this
standpoint distinctions between "special" and "general" funds are meaning-
less and questions as to the incorporation of locals or their "independence" are
irrelevant. Where the two-fold contract states specifically that on secession
local property vests in loyal members or in the parent if less than a specified
minimum remain, the court should follow the contract only if the parent has
remained faithful to its obligations.
After a parent has ceased to uphold objectives agreed upon when the local
joined the national organization, those who declined to continue the affiliation
should not forfeit all claim to local property on seceding.40 The interests of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggra-
vate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power
of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions . . .by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargain-
ing. .. . National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946),
as amended, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (Supp. 1948).
38. BRooKs, WHEN LABOR ORGANIzES 40-5 (1937); DAUGHERTY, LABOR PRoLEmS
ix A [mucAw INDUsTRY, 411-2 (5th ed. 1941); de Vyver, The istra-Union Control of
Collective Bargaining, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 288, 297 (1938).
39. For a discussion of the policy of the National Labor Relations Board toward cer-
tification after a secession has taken place from the ranks of the collective bargaining
agent, see Comment, 51 YALE L. J. 465, 466-72 (1942) ; Comment, 37 ILL. L. Rv. 43,
46-7 (1943) ; Comment, 10 Mo. L. Rav. 64 (1945).
Though some of the union stability is lost when employees are allowed to change
their affiliation, a categorical refusal to allow a change of affiliation may enable union
leadership to tramp on the local members. Comment, 37 ILL. L. REv. 43, 49 (1943).
There is some indication of efforts by entrenched union leadership to choke off the legiti.
mate criticism of minorities. Note, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 537, 541 (1948).
40. Adoption of this rule would turn future litigation on the question of fact as to the
good faith of the parent in following the terms and spirit of the two-fold contract.
1178 [Vol. 58
